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International Competition, Debt, and Uneven  





This paper examines whether the intensification of international competition widens 
the gap between developing and developed economies. The intensification of 
international competition with an influential trade union in the North is known to lower 
the North’s markup rate. This paper is unique because it points out that the intensification 
of international competition can widen the North-South gap when the Southern debt is 
taken into consideration. It also shows that the egalitarian policy in the North as 
influenced by trade unions is compatible with its international policy: relief of interest 
payments. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Economic globalization that has gained much momentum recently has further 
intensified international competition. One contributing factor is the influx of new 
players from the newly industrialized economies; including the East Asian 
economies. 
On the other hand, there are still many Southern eco omies that are left out in this 
international competition, all of which are still burdened with large debt. This paper 
examines whether the intensification of international competition widens the gap between 
the Northern economies and the debt-laden Southern eco omies. Figure 1 is a visual 
expression of the purpose of this paper. 
As Adachi (1995) says, the intensification of interational competition alters the 
monopoly power (markup rate) of the North. Normally, international competition tends to 
lower the North’s monopoly power. However, it is possible that the monopoly power of 
the North will increase should the Northern economies have adjusted to the plunge in the 
wage rate due to the pressure of international competition. Therefore the change of the 
North’s monopoly power as a result of the intense int rnational competition is influenced 
by the power struggle between the union and management.  
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Dutt (1988) and Sarkar (1994) are works that discused the relationship between 
the North’s monopoly power and North-South economy.12Dutt (1988) tries to build a 
model based on Bran’s argument on the monopoly capital, in which Dutt (1988) 
introduces a Northern investment function that depends on the profit rate and the rate of 
capacity utilization. He showed that the increase in the North’s monopoly power worsens 
the rate at which the capacity utilization of the North is utilized, the terms of trade of the 
South and the growth rates in both regions and widens the North-South gap.23 In contrast, 
Sarkar (1994) features a Northern investment functio  hat depends only on profit rate. 
He showed that although the increase in the North’s monopoly power does lower its rate 
of capacity utilization, it does not have any effect on the South’s terms of trade as well as 
the growth rates in both regions. These works have one thing in common, namely the fact 
that they have a balance of trade equilibrium to begin with.  
Hence, the increase in the North’s monopoly power raises the demand for capital 
goods, which are produced only in the North, resulting a widening of the gap between 
North and South. However, a balance of trade equilibrium is certainly not a common 
phenomenon in the real world for there are countries in the South that are heavily 
indebted.  
North-South models built with an interest in the Southern debt could be found in 
Dutt (1989) and Nakatani (1991). Both works discussed the conditions required to create 
a North-South economy with sustainable growth. Dutt (1989) takes the South’s capital 
accumulation as an exogenous variable. Meanwhile, Nakatani (1991) introduces the 
South’s investment function, considering that the ballooning debt in the South suppresses 
its capital accumulation. However, the imperfect competitive Northern economy found in 
Dutt (1988) or Sarkar (1994) is not found in Nakatani (1991).  
Referring to this previous research, this paper introduces an independent 
investment function of the South, which takes the facts of the increasing debt and 
decreasing profit rate in the South suppressing its capital accumulation into consideration, 
and relieves the balance of trade equilibrium assumption proposed in Sarkar (1994). 
 
1Adachi (1995) also writes on the relationship betwen the North’s markup rate and the North-South 
economy but it will not be referred to in this paper b cause the research was done focusing not on the North-
South gap but on the terms of trade and capital flows were introduced into it. 
2The South-North capital ratio is used as the gap index in Dutt (1988) and this paper will follow suit. 
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Having such a model built, I will examine how the North’s monopoly power influences 
the North-South gap. Based on this, we can discuss how the intensification of 
international competition influences the North-South gap, considering that the South is 
indebted. 
 
2.  SARKAR (1994) MODEL 
An explanation of the Sarkar (1994) model is attempted in this section 2.1 outlines 
the model’s basic structure and section 2.2 includes th  arguments on how the change in 
the North’s monopoly power influences the North-South gap. 
 
2.1.  Basic Structure of the Model 
Northern Economy. An industrial good that acts as both a consumption and
capital good, Y, is produced in the North. Denoting K as the capital good used in the 
North, u as the rate of capacity utilization and δ as a fixed technology coefficient, we can 
write the production function as 
Y = uδK,     u < 1 … … … … … … (1) 
Denote P as the price of the good in the North, z as the markup rate, W as the nominal 
wage rate and b as the labor-output ratio, the North’s pricing equation could be written as 
P = (1 + z) Wb … … … … … … … (2) 
Furthermore, since the markup rate, z, carries information on the degree of monopoly 








 … … … … … … … (3) 
Assuming that g, the investment function of the North, is an increase function of 
its profit rate, r, we can conclude that 
g = α1 + α2r,    α1 > 0,    α2 > 0 … … … … … (4) 
α1 is the animal spirit of business entities. 
Southern Economy. The South produces low technology or primary goods, using 
its labor and capital goods imported from the North. In other words, the Southern 
economies in this paper are referred to as those economies that are still incapable of 
producing capital goods. Denote *Y  as the South’s total output, *K  as the total capital 
and assuming that the technology is fixed, we can express the South’s production 
function as 
*** KY α=  … … … … … … … (5) 
The South’s output-capital ratio, *a , is a constant. The real wage rate in the South, 
*V , remains constant at a subsistence level because there is surplus labour. 
Market Equilibrium. Both the North and South spend all of the wage income n 
consuming, save a certain fraction of the profit income and consume the rest of it. The 
North spends m  (0 < m < 1) of its total consumption expenditure on the Northern goods 
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and the rest on Southern goods. The South spends all its wage income on Southern goods 
while spend µ (0 < µ < 1) of its profit income on Northern goods and the rest on Southern 
goods. The price of Southern goods is denoted as *P .  
We can then express the consumption demand for Southern goods by the North as 
{ }WbYzsm )1(1)1( −+− , the consumption demand for Southern goods by the South itself 
as *********** )1)(1)(1( KaPbVsKbaVP −−µ−+ . Hence, the market equilibrium of the 
Southern goods is given by 
   (1–m){1+(1–s)z} WbY + P*V*a*b*K*  + (1–µ)(1–s*)(1–V*b* )P*a*K*–P*a*K*  = 0 (6) 
On the other hand, the consumption demand for Northern goods by the North is 
{ }WbYzsm )1(1 −+  and that by the South is ****** )1)(1( KaPbVs −−µ . Denote I and *I  
as the investment of North and South, respectively, the market equilibrium in the North is 
as follows because the investment demand for the Northern goods by both regions is 
*PIPI + . 
m{1+(1–s)z} WbY+µ(1–s*)(1–V*b* )P*a*K*  + PI+PI*–PY=0 … … (7) 
Balance of Trade Equilibrium. The North imports consumption goods from the 
South while the South imports both consumption and investment goods from the North. 
Since the imports of Southern goods by the North is { }WbYzsm )1(1)1( −+−  while the 
imports of Northern goods by the South is ******* )1)(1( PIKaPbVs +−−µ , the balance 
of trade equilibrium could be expressed as 
(1–m){1+(1–s)z} WbY – µ (1–s*)(1–V*b* )P*a*K*  – PI* = 0 … … (8) 
Capital Accumulation. Define the North-South capital ratio as 
*K
K
h =  and since 
K
I






g = , the dynamic equation that shows the North-South capital 
accumulation is given by 
*ˆ ggh −=  … … … … … … … (9) 





= , Equation (6) 







–{s*+(1–s*)µ}(1–V*b* )a*p = 0 … … … (10) 
Similarly, applying the balance of trade equilibrium Equation (8), Equation (7) that 










 … … … … … … (11) 
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 … … … … … … (12) 
With the same spirit, applying Equation (6) and (8), the Southern capital 
accumulation rate could be expressed as 
g* = s* (1 – V*b* ) pa* … … … … … … (13) 
Adding Equation (9) will give us a total of equations and five endogenous 
variables respectively; namely u, p, g, *g  and h, making this a closed system. Assuming 
h is taking a certain value from Equation (9), p and u will be solved in (10) and (11), 
respectively. Hence, *g  and g are solved in (12) and (13), respectively. 
 
2.2.  The North’s Monopoly Power and Uneven Development 
We will see how the change in the North’s monopoly power influences the North-
South gap in this section. 
Short-run Equilibrium Analysis. Let’s start with the short run analysis where the 
market equilibrium is achieved in both regions. This means Equation (9) will have to be 
removed for now and h treated as an exogenous variable.34 









 … … … … … … (14) 



























 … (15) 
This result is obtained because the rise in z changes the type of received income from 
wage income with a high propensity for consumption o profit income with a low propensity 
for consumption, and as a result, worsens the total c nsumption demand in the North.  
Long-run Equilibrium Analysis. Next we shall turn to the long run equilibrium 
when the capital accumulation rate of both regions is identical.45 We know that 0ˆ =h  so 












 … … … … … (16) 
 









 holds around the proximity of the 
equilibrium, this system is therefore stable thereon. 
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This means the North-South gap widens when the monopoly power of the North 
increases. It is so because the increase in the North’s monopoly power raises the North’s 
demand for capital goods, which are produced only in the North. The transfer from wage 
income to profit income as a result of the bigger monopoly power raises the demand for 
investment goods.  
 
3.  INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION AND  
THE SOUTHERN DEBT 
What makes this section different from the last is that the Southern debt is taken 
into consideration here. 
 
3.1. Basic Structure of the Model 
Market Equilibrium. Denote D as the South’s debt measured in terms of the 
Northern good, with the interest rate on the debt as i.
The market equilibrium of the Southern and Northern goods, Equations (6) and 
(7), could be as follows because income transfer from the Southern profit income to a 
Northern one is done. 
(1–m){ WbY+(1–s)(zWbY+iPD)}+P*V*a*b*K* +(1–µ)(1–s*). 
         {(1–V*b* )P*a*K* –iPD}–P*a*K*  = 0 … … … … (17) 
m{ WbY+(1–s)(zWbY + iPD)}+ µ(1–s*){(1–V*b* )P*a*K*  – iPD} 
             +PI+PI*–PY = 0 … … … … … … (18) 
Capital Accumulation in the South. We introduce an independent investment 
function of the South.We assume that it is an increase function of its profit, *r . Next, we 
consider the relationship between the debt and investm nt. The increasing debt of the 
South will worsen its credit rating as seen from the North. Therefore, cutting down on 
imports from the North would be a plausible way forthe South to improve its trade 
deficit. Denote the debt capital ratio as 
*K
D
f =  and the South’s investment function is 
given as 
g* =β1 + β2r*  – β3f,       β1 > 0,    β2 > 0,  β3 > 0, … … … (19) 
β1 represents the Southern government’s planned investment, etc. 
Dynamic Equation of the Southern Debt. The increase in the South’s debt,D&  




zsmIKpabVsD +−+−−+−−µ= })1(1){1(****)*1*)(1(&  … (20) 
The dynamic equation of the South’s debt capital ratio, f, is given as 
*ˆˆ gDf −=  … … … … … … … (21) 
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Intensive Form. Similar to that done in the last section, the market equilibriums of 
























0*)}1()1({**)*1( 32 =−µ−−+δ−β−−β+ ifssmuhfpabV  … (23) 









})1(1){1(**)*1*)(1(*)1(&  … (24) 
Putting together (9), (12) and (19) alongside (22) ~ (24), we have a total of six 
equations and variables respectively, u, p, g, *g , h and f, closing this system. As for the 
determinant relations, assuming that  and f each take a certain value from (9) and (24), p 
and u are solved from (12), (14), (22) and (23). 
 
3.2. The Change in Monopoly Power of the North and Uneven Development 
We will examine how the change in the North’s monopoly power influences the 
North-South gap in this section.56 
Firstly, we will take a look at the short-run where market equilibrium is achieved 
in both regions. Next, based on findings obtained through short-run analyses, we will 
demonstrate how the North’s mark up rate, z, affects h in long-run equilibrium and 
unstable analysis. The economy becomes unstable when the interest rate on the debt is 
sufficiently large. The situation parallels the real world in developing countries. Long-run 
analyses will address both phases—stable and unstable. 
Short-run Equilibrium Analysis. We are going to discard both (9) and (24) for 
now and take both and f as exogenous variables. The next equation shows ho h, f and 
z affect p and u.67 
))(),(),)(()),(),(),(( −−−=−−+= zfhuuzfhpp  … … … (25) 
The increase in h brings about two changes—a decreasing rate of capacity 
utilization in the North and improved terms of trade in the South. As for the increase in f, 
it worsens the South’s terms of trade while reducing the North’s rate of capacity 
utilization due to the decrease in investment demand in the South. The increase in 
monopoly power in the North reduces its consumption demands as well as the rate of 
capacity utilization, and worsens the South’s terms of trade. 
 
5Sarkar (1997) assumes that the North’s monopoly power is a increase function of the Southern terms 
of trade to consider the aspect of competitiveness b tween North and South. But we will work at this point in a 
different paper because we follow Sarkar (1994) model. 
6Please refer to Appendix 2 for calculations. 
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Long-run Equilibrium Analysis. Dynamic Equations (9) and (24) are required 








α+α=&  … … … (26) 
**)*1*)(1(}**)*1(){1( 321 pabVsfpabVff −−µ+β−−β+β−=&  







})1(1){1(  … (27) 




dh 122221 −=  … … … … … … (28) 


























.   
That is to say, when the international monetary market is tight, the increase in the 
North’s monopoly power decreases the North-South gap, and vice versa. 
Next, we use some graphs. Figure 2 illustrates the p ase diagram when the 
international monetary market is not tight or  interest payments are reduced.  The increase  
 
Fig. 2.  When the International Monetary Market is not Tight (Equilibrium Analysis) 
h f 0= h 0=
f  
 
7Please refer to Appendix 3 for stability conditions and calculations in the long-run equilibrium. 
8Incidentally, a sign of 
dz
df
 is undecided, and the result is not dependent on interest rate. 
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in z brings about decreasing imports in both regions because of the decrease in the rate of 
capacity utilization in the North and the terms of trade in the South. Thus, the Northern 
balance of trade improves because decreasing imports in the North are larger than in the 
South, hence the profit rate in the North increases. So the 0=h&  curve shifts to the top 
left. On the other hand, the the 0=f&  curve shifts to the top right to adjust to the 
improvement in the Northern balance of trade. Therefore we found that the increase of z 
brings about the increase of h. 
Figure 3 illustrates the phase diagram when the intrnational monetary market is 
tight. The point different from Figure 2 is that the 0=f&  curve shifts to the top left when 
z increases. In other words, the increase in the Northern trade surplus brings about a 




more probable as the inclination of the 0=f&  curve becomes more steep in Figure 3.  
Long-run Unstable Analysis. We perform this analysis using Equations (26) and 
(27). The phase diagram of the unstable case is depcted in Figure 4.910 
The increase in z shifts the 0=h&  and 0=f&  curves to the upper left because the 
Northern net export increases (Figure 5). 
The increase in the Northern net export increases g and decreases f. Once f 
increases, it does so rapidly because the interest rate is extremely high. Therefore, g* 
continues to decrease. In this way, h increases with increasing f from beginning to end. In 
this explosive path, the South can refuse to make int rest payments for some time or 
repudiate its debt.1011 
 






9In this case, |det|<0 because the interest rate on the debt is sufficiently large. 
10This result depends on the linear investment functio  of f in the South, (19). Our paper does not 
address this problem. 
Taro Abe 276













We have analyzed how the change in the North’s monop ly power influences the 
North-South gap. The model featured in this paper is one that acknowledges the existence 
of Southern debt and accounts for its effect on the Southern investment. To date, it is 
concluded that the increase in the North’s monopoly wer will widen the North-South 
gap, as can be shown in Sarkar (1994) model, in which a balance of trade equilibrium is 
assumed. This paper, however, illustrates the possibility of a narrowing North-South gap 
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when the interest rate on the South’s debt is sufficiently high in equilibrium analysis. This 
result is obtained in a world without a balance of trade equilibrium, meaning that the 
reduction in the South’s imports, in turn, reduces its debt and, as a result, promotes 
capital accumulation. Conversely, when the North’s monopoly power is reduced, the 
North-South gap will definitely narrow when the balance of trade equilibrium does exist, 
however, a widening North-South gap is possible within he framework of this paper. 
Noticing the polarization of union-management in the North, we can conclude the 
following. In a scenario where the South has no debt and the balance of trade equilibrium 
is in place, assuming that the union labor in the North is sufficiently influential, the 
monopoly power of the North will decrease and the North-South gap will definitely 
narrow when international competition intensifies. On the other hand, in a scenario where 
the South is indebted and negatively influences its growth thereon, it is necessary for the 
interest rate on the South’s debt to be sufficiently low in order to narrow the North-South 
gap in the stable phase, with the assumption that international competition intensifies 
along with an influential union labor in the North. 
In the unstable phase with the above-mentioned assumption, the gap continues to 
narrow and finally reaches the point at which f=0 (Figure 6). At that time, the debt 
problem in the South vanishes. The following effect reflects this result. When the North’s 
monopoly power is reduced, its net export decreases. Then f decreases and subsequently 
continues to decrease because the interest payments d crease greatly from the high 
interest rate. As f decreases, the interest payments will decrease according to the interest 
rate. A higher interest rate will further reduce thinterest payments. 
 





Therefore, what makes this paper unique is that it illustrates that when taking the 
Southern debt problem into consideration, the way in which the intensified international 
competition influences the North-South gap differs from the case in which a balance of 
trade equilibrium is assumed thereon.  
From the results described above we can obtain some implications regarding the 
egalitarian policy. In the unstable phase, the decrease of the North’s monopoly power 
decreases the gap. This result does not mean that relief of payments is not needed: other 
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factors can widen it and exacerbate the debt problem in the unstable phase. In the stable 
phase with the higher interest rate, the decrease of the North’s monopoly power widens 
the gap. However, in the case of the lower interest ate, we obtain the opposite result. 
Consequently, we showed that the egalitarian policy in the North from the influential 
trade union is compatible with its international poicy: relief of interest payments. 
We must remember that our result depends on the specification of parameters, as 
we said in Appendix 2, and we don’t introduce the int rnational monetary sector into this 
paper. On top of that, further empirical research has to be done on how the intensification 
in international competition influences the monopoly power of the North. These shall be 
left for future studies.  
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APPENDIX 1 
Take h as exogenously given, based on (10) and (11), the adjustment equation of 
terms of trade and the rate of capacity utilization, p and u, are given as 
pabVsszsmp z
uh **)*1}(*)1(*{})1(1){1( 1 −µ−+−−+−= +









u&  … … … … … … (30) 
The right hand side of both equations illustrates a urplus in demand. Linearly 
approximate this dynamic equation at its equilibrium value ( ep , eu ) and we will obtain 


















 … (31) 
We now know this is stable because if s<α2  then trace < 0 hence |det| > 0. 
 
APPENDIX 2 
We assume that m=µ  and *ss =  as a special case in Dutt (1989) because we 
don’t pay attention to the effect on income distribut on in the short term by interest 
payments. Take h and f as exogenously given, based on (22) and (23), the adjustment 
equation of the terms of trade and the rate of capacity utilisation, p and u, are given as 
pabVsszsmp z
uh **)*1}(*)1(*{})1(1){1( 1 −µ−+−−+−= +








        uhfuh δ−β−β+δ 31  … … … … … … (33) 
The right hand side of both equations illustrates a urplus in demand. Linearly 
approximate these dynamic equations at their equilibrium value  ( ep , eu )  and we will 











})()1)(1({0**)*1}(*)1({  (34) 
Suppose ms<α2 , we can demonstrate that trace<0 and |det|>0 because 022 <b , 
hence the stability conditions hold. Furthermore, using Equations (32) and (33), the 
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APPENDIX 3 




})1(1){1)(( 311 −+−β−β+α=  
)*)(1)(1()(*)1{(**)*1( 22 β−+−+α−µ−−= szmszsabVE  






+β−β+αµ−+= )1()}(*)1(*{ 311  … … … … (42) 
Substituting Equations (41) and (42) into (26) and (27), we get 








−+−β−µ−+αβ−β+α+  (43) 
 
iffff +β−β−= ))(1( 31&  








−β−−+−β−β+α+  (44) 
 
Linearly approximate Equations (43) and (44) at their equilibrium ( eh , ef ), we 






















































We assume that 011 <c  and 012 >c .  

















































































dh 122221 −=  … … … … … … (46) 
Taro Abe 282




























  … … (47) 
 






















































































From B>0, C>0 and D<0, we get D<B, C. 











the stability conditions hold. 
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